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CHAPTER5 
Evidence 
NOEL AUGUSTYN* 
§ 5.1. Prior Criminal Conduct - Impeachment - Judicial Discretion. 
It is well settled in Massachusetts1 and other jurisdictions2 that a witness's 
credibility may be impeached through the use of his prior convictions. This 
rule evolved from, and is a modification of, the ancient common law rule 
rendering totally incompetent a witness with a criminal record. 3 While to-
day such witnesses are competent to testify, the prior conviction rule still 
creates problems of apparent unfairness. For example, the value of the rule 
may be questionable when the witness's prior crimes are unrelated to his 
propensity not to tell the truth. Moreover, the rule presents special difficul-
ties when the witness subject to such impeachment in a criminal case is the 
• NOEL AUGUSTYN is Assistant Dean and Assistant Professor of Law at Boston College 
Law School. 
§ 5.1. ' G.L. c. 233, § 21 provides: 
The conviction of a witness of a crime may be shown to affect his credibility, except 
as follows: 
First, the record of his conviction of a misdemeanor shall not be shown for such pur-
pose after five years from the date on which sentence on said conviction was imposed, 
unless he has subsequently been convicted of a crime within five years of the time of his 
testifying. · 
Second, the record of his conviction of a felony upon which no sentence was imposed 
or a sentence was imposed and the execution thereof suspended, or upon which a fine 
only was imposed, or a sentence to a reformatory prison, jail, or house of correction, 
shall not be shown for such purpose after ten years from the date of conviction, if no 
sentence was imposed, or from the date on which sentence on said conviction was im-
posed, whether the execution thereof was suspended or not, unless he has subsequently 
been convicted of a crime within ten years of the time of his testifying. For the purpose 
of this paragraph, a plea of guilty or a finding or verdict of guilty shall constitute a con-
viction within the meaning of this section. 
Third, the record of his conviction of a felony upon which a state prison sentence was 
imposed shall not be shown for such purpose after ten years from the date of expiration 
of the minimum term of imprisonment imposed by the court, unless he has subsequently 
been convicted of a crime within ten years of the time of his testifying. 
Fourth, the record of his conviction for a traffic violation upon which a fine only was 
imposed shall not be shown for such purpose unless he has been convicted of another 
crime or crimes within five years of the time of his testifying. 
2 See McCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (1972), § 43, pp. 84-90. 
' /d. at§ 43. 
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accused himself, and when the prior conviction is similar, identical, or 
related to the crime with which he is presently charged. 
The Massachusetts statute permitting impeachment of the accused on the 
basis of prior convictions• was examined during the Survey year by the 
Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Diaz.' In Diaz, the defendant 
was indicted for unlawful distribution of a controlled substance (heroin) 
and for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute it. 6 At · 
the close of the Commonwealth's case, defendant's counsel moved the 
court to exclude the Commonwealth's anticipated use of defendant's two 
prior convictions (for possession of heroin with intent to distribute) for the 
likely purpose of impeaching the defendant if he took the stand. 7 The trial 
court denied the motion as a discretionary ruling. 8 Defendant's counsel then 
stated that because of this ruling he would not call the defendant as a wit-
ness. 9 The defendant introduced no evidence and was found guilty on both 
charges. 10 
The defendant appealed, contending, inter alia, that the statute permit-
ting witness impeachment via prior convictions was unconstitutional when 
applied to an accused where, as in the case at issue, the prior convictions (1) 
were identical with a crime now being charged and therefore highly preju-
dicial, and (2) did not involve the failure to tell the truth and were, there-
fore, not highly indicative of his credibility. 11 Defendant's argument was 
that the statute, as applied in this case, placed him in the proverbial jaws of 
Scylla and Charybdis; thus, were defendant to take the stand subject to im-
peachment via these prior convictions, the jury, despite limiting instruc-
tions, would use those convictions as a basis for inferring he committed the 
crimes at issue. Similarly, if defendant chose not to take the stand due to 
fear of the above, he would forego Massachusetts constitutional rights to 
testify in his own behalf, and moreover, might also suffer from negative in-
ferences by the jury because of his failure to so testify. 12 The statute, so 
defendant argued, as applied in this case, prevented him from getting a fair 
trial. The Court interpreted and summarized defendant's argument "in 
essence that the statute, having the effects or probable effects described, is 
not justified by a sufficient State interest." 13 
• See G.L. c. 233, § 21, supra, note 1. 
' 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 60S, 417 N.E.2d 9SO. 
• Id. at 606, 417 N.E.2d at 951. 
' Id. at 607, 417 N.E.2d at 9S2. 
I Id. 
'Id. 
lo Id. 
11 I d. at 608, 417 N .E.2d at 952. The Court also discussed a double jeopardy question which 
is beyond the scope of this chapter. Id. at 614-17, 417 N.E.2d at 9S6-S8. 
12 Id. at 608, 417 N.E.2d at 952. 
" Id. at 609, 417 N.E.2d at 953. 
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The Court then examined applicable Fedetal and Massachusetts case law, 
as well as the Proposed Massachusetts Rule of Evidence 609(a), and denied 
defendant's appeal. 14 The Court reasoned that the power of the trial court 
to exercise its discretion to exclude the prior convictions where undue preju-
dice outweighed probative value was sufficient to guarantee defendant a 
fair trial. 15 
With respect to Federal law, the Court examined the United States 
Supreme Court decision of Spencer v. Texas, 16 which recognized that past 
convictions can be probative of credibility and not violate the due process 
clause of the Federal Constitution. 17 As to the special difficulties en-
countered when the witness is the accused, the Court read the Spencer deci-
sion as citing the ameliorative effects of (1) the trial court's instructions that 
the jury confine its use of prior convictions to the issue of credibility and of 
(2) the practice whereby judges, in their discretion, exclude use of the prior 
convictions altogether when such information would be ''particularly preju-
dicial." 18 Thus, the Court concluded that under comparable Federal law 
and practice, there would be no violation of comparable Federal Constitu-
tional fourteenth amendment rights. 19 
The Court reached the same conclusion with respect to Article 12 of the 
Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the Commonwealth. 20 The 
Court cited the precedents of Commonwealth v. Chase, 21 and Common-
wealth v. Leno22 as well as other, earlier decisions23 in finding no constitu-
tional infirmity. The Diaz Court observed that in Chase and Leno, the ac-
cused was or would have been impeached by prior convictions of a crime 
14 /d. at 609-14, 417 N.E.2d at 953-56. 
" /d. at 611, 417 N.E.2d at 954. 
16 385 u.s. 554 (1967). 
" Id. at 560-61. 
11 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 609-10, 417 N.E.2d at 953. 
" /d. at 610, 417 N.E.2d at 953. 
20 Article XII provides: 
No subject shall be held to answer for any crimes or offense, until the same is fully 
and plainly, substantially and formally, described to him; or be compelled to accuse, or 
furnish evidence against himself. And every subject shall have a right to produce all 
proofs, that may be favorable to him; to meet the witnesses against him face to face, 
and to be fully heard in his defense by himself, or his counsel, at his election. And no 
subject shall be arrested, imprisoned, despoiled, or deprived of his property, im-
munities, or privileges, put out of the protection of the law, exiled, or deprived of his 
life, liberty, or estate, but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land. 
21 372 Mass. 736, 363 N.E.2d 1105 (1977). 
22 374 Mass. 716, 374 N.E.2d 572 (1978). 
" Co~monwealth v. Sheeran, 370 Mass. 82, 88 (1976); Commonwealth v. Boyd, 367 Mass. 
169, 174 (1975); Commonwealth v. DiMarzo, 364 Mass. 669, 678 (1974); Commonwealth v. 
Ladetto, 353 Mass. 746 (1967). 
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similar to the one charged; moreover, those prior convictions did not bear 
directly on credibility. 24 Based upon its decisions against the accused ap-
pellants in those ~es, the Court in Diaz held that the statute in question 
strikes an appropriate constitutional balance between possible unfairness to 
defendants and the need for the trier of fact to have useful information 
available, given the statutory exceptions for convictions remote in time and 
the use of limiting instructions at trial. 25 Moreover, while the applicable 
Massachusetts statute does not explicitly provide for judicial "discretion" 
in excluding altogether such impeaching evidence in situations where likely 
prejudice to the defendant is greatest, 26 the Court noted that its previous 
decision in Chase effectively recognized that the trial court has such discre-
tion. 27 The trial court's failure to exercise this discretion in defendant's 
behalf, therefore, is not reversible error. 
Finally, the Court looked to the future and examined Proposed Massa-
chusetts Rule of Evidence 609(a). The Proposed Rule explicitly provides 
that ''the court shall have discretion to exclude evidence of a prior convic-
tion offered to impeach the credibility of the accused if it fmds that its 
probative v~ue is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." 21 Thus, 
with respect to situations similar to the case at issue, the Proposed Rule, if 
enacted, would merely codify the trial court's authority to exclude such evi-
dence, as established in Diaz and Chase. 
The Court concluded its discussion by evaluating the types of factors a 
trial court might consider in applying the "probative value" v. "unfair 
prejudice" test, and cited those suggested in the landmark federal case of 
United States v. Gordon. 29 Specifically, the Court stated that some of the 
factors include the relation of the conviction to credibility, the defendant's 
criminal conduct, if any, after the conviction, the similarity of the current 
charge to past convictions, the importance of defendant's testimony to his 
defense and how important the defendant's credibility is to the resolution of 
factual disputes. 3° Furthermore, the Court recommended that a ruling 
14 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 611, 417 N.E.2d at 954. 
lS /d. 
16 Indeed, G.L. c. 23, § 21, supra at note 1, makes no provision for exclusion by the judge of 
such evidence whatsoever. 
1
' 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 612, 417 N.E.2d at 954-55. Commonwealth v. West, 357 Mass. 
245,258 N.E.2d 22 (1970) which held that G.L. c. 23, § 21, did "not clothe the judge with dis-
cretion to receive or exclude" evidence of prior convictions. /d. at 249, 258 N .E.2d at 24. West 
was treated in the 1970 ANN. SuRv. OF MAss. LAw § 27.2 at 679-81. Diaz effectively overrules 
West completely in this regard. 
11 The Proposed Rule quoted therein continues: "There shall be no discretion to exclude a 
prior conviction offered to impeach the credibility of any other witness." 
19 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968). 
•• 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 613, 417 N.E.2d at 955. 
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should be made on a defendant's motion to bar this type of impeachment 
"at an early moment." 31 Thus, defense attorneys should be prepared to 
state such specific arguments for the exclusion of prior convictions when the 
defendant wishes to testify in his own behalf. 
In sum, the Court in Diaz held that the application of chapter 233, section 
21 of the General Laws permitting a prosecutor to impeach a defendant wit-
ness by introducing his prior convictions, even where one of those convic-
tions was identical to one of the crimes at issue, and even where the convic-
tions were not directly bearing on credibility did not deny the defendant's 
right to a fair trial as guaranteed by Article 12 of the Massachusetts Decla-
ration of Rights. The Court observed .and reaffirmed that this impeachment 
power, as interpreted and applied in previous decisions, is not absolute but 
is mitigated by the trial court's own power to issue limiting instructions to 
the jury and to exercise its discretion to exclude impeaching evidence 
altogether when its probative value is outweighed by undue prejudice. The 
Court's ruling is in accord with present Federal law and also with the Pro-
posed Mass. Rule of Evidence 609(a), as the Court refused to construe the 
Massachusetts Constitution more broadly than its Federal counterpart. 
Future decisions may further define under what circumstances undue prej-
udice will override the need for "useful information." ' 
La,ter in the Survey Year, the Court again addressed the issue of when 
prior convictions can be used as evidence in the case of Commonwealth v. 
Jackson. 32 In Jackson the defendant was tried and convicted of murder in 
the first degree. 33 At trial, he requested and received an advisory ruling con-
cerning the prosecutor's use of prior convictions for murder and for assault 
with a deadly weapon. The trial court informed defendant that should he 
testify the murder conviction would be excluded but that the assault convic-
tion, which was related to the crime at issue, could be used against him. 34 
The defendant did not take the stand. 35 
The defendant appealed, contending, among other things, that the trial 
court's ruling "impermissibly infringed his right to testify on his own behalf 
and so denied his constitutional right to a fair trial" pursuant to Article 12 
of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution. 36 In deny-
" /d. 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2196, 428 N.E.2d at 289. 
" /d. at 2197, 428 N.E.2d at 290. 
" /d. at 2203-04, 428 N.E.2d at 293-94. 
" /d. at 2204, 428 N.E.2d at 294. 
36 /d. For the text of Art. 12 see note 20 supra. The defendant also argued that admission of 
evjdence of prior crimes, a misstatement in the prosecutor's opening statement, the presence of 
witnesses after a sequestration order, and a fifty-seven month delay between indictment and 
trial were grounds for reversal. /d. at 2201-210, 428 N.E.2d at 292-97. All but the first of these 
issues is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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ing the appeal, the Court cited the permissibility of the "prior convictions" 
impeachment technique pursuant to chapter 233, section 21. 37 The Court, 
citing Diaz, then went on to say that while the trial court has discretion to 
exclude the prior convictions, its refusal to do so and the possible prejudice 
to the defendant resulting therefrom is not a constitutional issue that can be 
reviewed on appeal. 38 
Thus, the Court in Jackson implicitly reaffirmed what it said, in effect, in 
Diaz, i.e., so long as the trial court is empowered with discretion to balance 
the competing factors of probative value and undue prejudice, the use of 
prior convictions pursuant to chapter 233, section 21, is not a violation of 
the "fair trial" provision of the Massachusetts Constitution, even when the 
prior convictions are similar to or, as here, related to the crime at issue. Pur-
suant to its discretionary powers, the trial court's determination that the 
defendant has not been unduly prejudiced normally will not be abrogated. 
Jackson presented still another issue, not involving witness impeachment, 
which the Court viewed as being resolvable within the ambit of judicial dis-
cretion. This issue involved evidence of a statement the defendant made 
wherein he effectively confessed to the murders of five women, including 
the victim in the case at hand. Subsequent to the defendant's apprehension 
and arrest as a suspect he was visited by a friend who discussed with him 
newspaper articles concerning an investigation into the murders of six 
young women, one of whom was the victim in the case at issue. The 
newspaper articles referred to a murder in New Hampshire, and the defend-
ant voluntarily told a friend, who so testified at trial, that "the one in New 
Hampshire [was not the defendant's]." 39 
Defendant, on appeal, argued that this testimony was inadmissible be-
cause it tied him not only to the murder at issue, but also to other well-pub-
licized murders which created real danger that the jury would base its deci-
sion on the defendant's criminal propensity instead of the evidence of the 
crime. 40 The Court rejected this argument. It observed that defendant's 
statement regarding the murder of the victim in the instant case was literally 
"indivisible" from his statement about the other murders. 4' The Court 
noted that evidence which is otherwise relevant to the offense charged does 
not become ''inadmissible simply because it tends to prove the commission 
of other crimes." 42 The Court also noted, in contrast, that where evidence 
" /d. at 2204, 428 N.E.2d at 294. 
" Id. 
" /d. at 2201, 428 N.E.2d at 292 . 
•• /d . 
•• /d. 
•• /d. (citations omitted). At common law, evidence of other crimes cannot be admitted to 
prove defendant's criminal character. However, such evidence is admissible, when relevant, 
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, intent, plan, knowledge, identity, lack of mistake 
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of other crimes is not relevant to the offense at issue, that evidence generally 
is inadmissible, even if it stems from the defendant's voluntary admission. 43 
Here, however, the Court found defendant's statement to be "obviously 
relevant.'' 44 
The Court having thus determined the existence of probative value, then 
turned to the counterweight of undue prejudice. In finding none existed, it 
said that in this case the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant was 
diminished by his prior introduction of evidence which implicated him in 
yet a different murder.4 ' The Court then held that the defendant's admis-
sion to his friend about the offense charged was so bound up with the unre-
lated crimes, that to sever the unrelated admission from the full statement 
would render the relevant admission unintelligible, and that the entire ad-
mission could be, and was, properly admitted into evidence. 46 Thus, the 
Court found that the trial judge had properly balanced considerations of 
probative value and prejudice, in his exercise of discretion, by not excluding 
the admission from evidence. 47 
In sum, in both Diaz and Jackson the Court found that the very existence 
of a trial court's power to exercise judicial discretion in excluding evidence 
of prior convictions for impeachment purposes was a sufficient guarantee 
against a violation of the "fair trial" provision of the Massachusetts Con-
stitution. Moreover, in Jackson the Court appeared to extend the same rea-
soning to the use of evidence of "other crimes" in a nonimpeachment con-
text. 
§ 5.2. Rape Shield Statute - Impeachment - Right to Show Bias. A 
standard form of impeaching the credibility of a witness is to prove either 
on cross-examination or by adducing extrinsic evidence that the witness is 
"biased." 1 The ability of the cross-examiner to show witness bias, also 
called "prejudice," "interest," or "corruption," 2 in Massachusetts is not a 
"collateral" matter, but rather a matter of "right" that may assume consti-
tutional dimensions if the witness has testified to material facts. 3 
This "right" of the cross-examiner to prove witness bias was demon-
strated during the Survey year in the difficult case of Commonwealth v. 
or accident, etc. See McCoRMICK, supra note 2, § 190, pp. 447-54. See also FED. R. EviD. 
404{b) and PROPOSED MASS. R. EviD. 404(b). 
•• /d. at 2202, 428 N.E.2d at 292. 
•• /d. at 2201, 428 N.E.2d at 292. 
•• /d. at 2202, 428 N.E.2d at 293 . 
•• /d. 
47 /d. 
§ 5.2. 1 See McCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (1972) § 40, pp. 78-81. 
2 /d. 
' LIACOS, HANDBOOK OF MAssACHUSETTS EVIDENCE (1981) at 145. 
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Joyce. 4 In Joyce-the defendant was convicted of rape and the commission of 
an unnatural and lascivious act.' His argument on appeal was that the trial 
CQurt improperly excluded a line of questioning by defense counsel which 
intended to show bias by the complaining witness. 6 
The prosecution presented evidence showing that complainant was hitch-
hiking and defendant picked her up. The complainant testified that defend-
ant drove her to a parking lot where he forced her to perform oral sex and to 
engage in intercourse twice. 7 She testified that she attempted twice to escape 
from the car and fmally did so upon the approach of another car, which was 
a police cruiser. • Complainant ran to the cruiser and accused defendant of 
raping her. 9 
Defendant's testimony raised the defense of consent. He testified that it 
was the complainant who requested they drive to the parking lot and it was 
upon complainant's suggestion that they engaged in sexual acts. 10 At the 
trial, defendant wished to introduce evidence either through cross-examina-
tion of the complainant or through the testimony of police officers that on 
two separate occasions prior to the incident at issue the complainant had 
been charged with prostitution. 11 Defendant stated in effect that his purpose 
in introducing such evidence was not' to impeach the defendant via the 
method of "prior bad acts." 12 Rather, defendant argued, by showing that 
complainant had been found in similar situations previously, and had con-
sequently been arrested and charged with sexual crimes, he could prove she 
had in this instance a motive to falsify her accusation and testimony that 
defendant raped her so that she would not be further prosecuted herself for 
sexual criminal acts. 13 In brief, defendant argued that complainant's testi-
mony was "biased." The trial judge, however, refused defendant permis-
sion to offer evidence or to cross-examine complainant on this issue. The 
judge based his ruling on the prohibition in the Massachusetts 
"rape-shield'' statute, chapter 233, section 21B, 14 against admitting in a 
• 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 29, 415 N.E.2d at 181. 
' /d. at 39, 415 N.E.2d at 181. 
• /d. 
7 /d. at 40, 415 N.E.2d at 183. 
I /d . 
• ld. 
10 /d. at 41, 415 N.E.2d at 183. 
II /d. 
12 /d. The term "specific instances of conduct" (actually "misconduct") and "prior bad 
acts" are used here synonymously. This impeachment technique is barred in cases of this kind 
by G.L. c. 233, § 21B, the so-called "Rape Shield Statute" discussed in the text and set forth in 
note 14 infra. 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 41-42, 415 N.E.2d at 184. 
14 The statute provides: 
, 21B. Evidence of sex crime victim's sexual conduct; admission hearing; findings 
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rape trial evidence of reputation or of specific instances of a rape victim's 
sexual conduct." 
The Supreme Judicial Court, on appeal, agreed with the defendant that 
there was error in the exclusion of the questions. 16 Upon review of the rec-
ord, it found that the trial judge improperly applied the statute. 17 
The Court reviewed the policy for the statute's bar to the admission of 
evidence of "specific instances of sexual conduct" and found it to be essen-
tially a codification of the pre-statute common law rule. 18 The Court noted 
previous decisions stating that evidence of these specific instances of con-
duct not only focuses the attention of the fact finder away from the alleged 
criminal act of the accused, but also has little probative value on the issue of 
consent in the trial at hand. 19 Similarly, the Court noted that the statute 
reversed the common law rule which rendered evidence of the 
complainant's "reputation" for unchastity adqllssible. zo The rationale for 
this reversal, the Court observed, was that inquiries into the sexual history 
of a rape complainant often makes her unwilling to testify, and, moreover, 
are "only marginally, if at all, probative of consent." 21 
Upon this review of the statute's history, however, the Court concluded 
the legislative history of section 21B did not reveal any consideration of the 
constitutional right to cross-examination and, more particularly, the ques-
tion of impeachment by proof of bias. zz Indeed, the Court went on to say 
that "evidence of prior acts, statements or circumstances may be relevant to 
show a complainant's motive to accuse falsely the defendant." 23 Citing 
Evidence of the reputation of a victim's sexual conduct shall not be admissible in any 
investigation or proceeding before a grand jury or any court of the commonwealth for a 
violation of sections twenty-two, twenty-two A, twenty-three, twenty-four and twenty-
four B of chapter two hundred and sixty-five. Evidence of specific instances of a 
victim's sexual conduct in such an investigation or proceeding shall not be admissible 
except evidence of the victim's sexual conduct with the defendant or evidence of recent 
conduct of the victim alleged to be the cause of any physical feature, characteristic, or 
condition of the victim; provided, however, that such evidence shall be admissible only 
after an in camera hearing on a written motion for admission of same and an offer of 
proof. If, after said hearing, the court finds that the weight and relevancy of said evi-
dence is sufficient to outweigh its prejudicial effect to the victim, the evidence shall be 
admitted; otherwise not. If the proceeding is a trial with jury, said hearing shall be held 
in the absence of the jury. The finding of the court shall be in writing and filed but shall 
not be made available to the jury. 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 42, 415 N.E.2d 184. 
16 Id. at 40, 415 N.E.2d at 183. 
" /d. at 43-44, 415 N.E.2d at 184-85. 
" Id. at 44, 415 N.E.2d at 185. 
"!d. 
20 /d. at 45, 415 N.E.2d at 185. 
2
' /d. at 45, 415 N.E.2d at 186. 
22 /d. at 45-46, 415 N.E.2d at 186. 
2
' /d. at 46, 415 N.E.2d at 186. 
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earlier Massachusetts cases and authorities, the Court declared that "[r]ea-
sonable cross-examination to show motive or bias has long been a matter of 
right." 24 Moreover, in an annotation to this statement the Court said that 
although it had never resolved the question whether the common law rule 
which excludes specific instances of conduct must yield to the defendant's 
attempts to show bias, it is clear that the "defendant's right to show bias 
must take precedence." 25 The Court concluded, therefore, that the "rape-
shield" statute did not abrogate the right to show bias based on specific in-
stances of sexual conduct. 26 
With respect to the case at issue, the Court found that the bias theory was 
"not inconsistent with the defendant's version of the facts. " 27 Thus, the 
evidence which defendant would have adduced, if so permitted, would, in 
reason, have a tendency to prove that the complainant was motivated to ac-
cuse defendant falsely in order to avoid her own further prosecution. 
The Court did not regard its holding as a departure from either the belief 
that prostitution is not relevant to credibility, or the policy of the statute 
which views prior sexual conduct as inadmissible to show consent. 21 The 
Court recognized, though, that when relevant facts show bias, or a motive 
to lie, "the general evidentiary rule of exclusion must give way to the consti-
tutionally based right of effective cross-examination.'' 29 
In limiting its holding, the Court reiterated that trial judges should use 
their discretion to restrict the scope of cross-examination in an effort to 
strike a balance between the policies of the "rape-shield" statute on the one 
hand, and the "right" to show bias on the other. 30 Thus, the trial judge 
should exclude as much evidence of specific instances of a complainant's 
sexual conduct as possible that will not unduly infringe upon the 
defendant's constitutional right to effective cross-examination in showing 
bias. 31 The trial court in the case at hand excluded all inquiry rather than 
simply limiting the scope of cross-examination, and thus a new trial was 
ordered.32 
In a concurring statement, Justice Braucher said that while the majority 
in the instant case properly construed the law, the witness's prior criminal 
complaints for prostitution afforded "a very slender basis for inferring a 
motive for false accusation." 33 Chief Justice Hennessy, also concurring in 
24 Id. (citations omitted}. 
25 Id. at n.7 . 
.. ld. 
27 Id. at 47, 415 N.E.2d at 187. 
21 Id. at 48, 415 N.E.2d at 187. 
2
' Id. (citations omitted}. 
" ld. at 48-49, 415 N.E.2d at 787-88. 
" Id. at 49, 415 N.E.2d at 188. 
,. Id. 
" ld. at SO, 415 N.E.2d at 188. 
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·the result, cautioned that the Court's opinion should be confined solely to 
those cases where the disputed evidence is "clearly relevant" to a showing 
of bias or motive to lie. 34 
Presumably, had the defendant in Joyce offered evidence not of criminal 
complaints concerning the alleged victim's prior sexual conduct, but simply 
"specific instances of conduct," "prior bad acts" or "reputation," the in-
ference of her motive to fabricate to avoid criminal prosecution would be 
far too weak to overcome the "rape-shield" statute. The "bias" argument 
in that type of case simply would not be convincing, and the evidence or 
cross-examination would be barred pursuant to the statute. In contrast, 
other fact patterns might arise where evidence of previous acts of sexual 
conduct could indeed show that complainant had a motive to fabricate, as 
in the case at issue, and hence the right to show bias would prevail. 
In sum, the Court in Joyce reaffirmed that showing "bias," at least inso-
far as the term is synonymous with "motive to fabricate," amounts to a 
"right" in Massachusetts which will not be overcome by the "rape-shield" 
statute. Indeed, where a conflict between the two exists, the trial court must 
do its best to permit the showing of bias while at the same time adhering to 
the proscription of the statute. Finally, concurring opinions emphasize that 
Joyce must be narrowly construed to further the policy of the statute. 
One reading of the Joyce case is that the trial court simply confused the 
technique of witness impeachment via "bias" with that of impeachment via 
"specific instances of conduct," also called "prior bad acts." H A similar 
confusion, as to impeachment via "bias," "prior bad acts," as well as 
"prior convictions" existed in a case heard later in the Survey year, Com-
monwealth v. Martinez. 36 
Martinez involved a murder whereby the victim was bound and gagged 
and died of asphyxiation due to a gag in his mouth and a ligature around his 
neck. 37 Certain crucial events leading up to the murder were witnessed by 
two men, both of whom testified at the trial. 38 One of these witnesses, 
Ryan, was the proprietor of the rooming house where the murder took 
place. He testified that he knew the defendant, observed him in the victim's 
room the night of the murder, found the victim's body the following morn-
ing, and posted bail for the defendant. 39 Ryan had previously been con-
•• /d. at 49-50, 415 N.E.2d at 188. 
" See note 12 supra. 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1945,425 N.E.2d at 300. Issues concerning the use of grand jury tes-
timony were also discussed, id. at 1949-53, 425 N.E.2d at 303-05, but are not examined here. 
" /d. at 1946, 425 N.E.2d at 301. 
" /d. at 1946-47, 425 N.E.2d at 301-02. 
" /d. at 1947, 425 N.E.2d at 301-02. 
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victed of certain crimes himself, although appeals from these convictions 
were pending. 40 
Defendant's appeal was based upon the trial court's refusal to permit the 
defendant from exploring with the witness Ryan the possibility of his having 
made some kind of arrangement with the prosecution concerning his own 
pending appeals, which arguably influenced his testimony.41 The trial court 
ruled that defense counsel could not inquire about the pending appeals 
because they were not final convictions. 42 
The Supreme Judicial Court held that the trial court erred, set the verdict 
aside and remanded the case. 43 The Court implicitly noted that the trial 
court inexcusably confused different modes of impeachment. Thus, defend-
ant's method of impeachment was not based upon attacking Ryan's credi-
bility via "prior convictions," 44 or via "prior bad acts," but rather was 
based, as was the case in Joyce, on "bias." Indeed, defendant clearly made 
known at trial what he was attempting to do, which the Court acknowl-
edged. 45 The Court ruled that because there was no ambiguity in defense 
counsel's tactics, the trial judge should have permitted questioning where 
the witness had already testified to material facts. 46 The Court cited and 
reiterated its holding in Joyce, among other cases, "that reasonable cross-
examination for the purpose of showing bias and prejudice is a matter of 
right." 47 Thus, the Court found that the trial judge abused his discretion. 48 
Both Joyce and Martinez, therefore, emphasize the distinction between 
impeachment via "bias" and via other techniques, particularly the method 
of "specific instances of conduct," or "prior bad acts." Moreover, the 
cases emphasize that impeachment via "bias" is a matter of right. Thus, in 
instances where impeachment via "bias" may overlap with improper im-
peachment via "prior bad acts," the court must exercise its discretion in 
such a way so that the right to show bias is not abrogated. 
STUDENT COMMENT 
§ 5.3. Intent-State of Mind Exception to the Hearsay Rule.* The ex-
istence of legal rights and liabilities often depends on a person's state of 
•• /d. at 1947, 425 N.E.2d at 302. 
" /d. 
" Id. at 1948, 425 N.E.2d at 302. 
" /d. at 1948, 1953, 425 N.E.2d at 302, 305. 
" See McCORMICK, supra note 1, §§ 40, 42 and 43. 
" 1!?81 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1948, 425 N.E.2d at 302 . 
•• /d. 
47 /d. 
" Id. at 1948-49, 425 N.E.2d at 302-03. 
* By Mitchell P. Portnoy, staff member, ANNuAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETIS LAW. 
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mind. 1 The need to ascertain this mental state arises in criminal cases, for 
example, where intent typically is a material element of a crime. z The crimi-
nal defendant, by denying that he possessed any such criminal intent, effec-
tively creates a disputed factual issue. The prosecution, to establish the 
presence of criminal intent on the part of the defendant, is permitted to rely 
on inferential evidence. 3 The criminal defendant, faced with the detrimental 
inferences generated by this type of evidence, instead may chose to rely on 
his personal testimony as the principal source of evidence in his favor. 4 Yet 
as he seeks to testify on his intent, the defendant may find his testimony 
constrained or even excluded by a combination of evidentiary rules and 
judicial misapplication of them. 
Present day rules of evidence, and the sometimes confused application of 
these rules, have roots traceable to early common law. Historically, any per-
son with a direct interest in the outcome of a trial was disqualified from 
testifying in it.' This broad incompetency rule extended to the parties in a 
lawsuit,' including the defendant in a criminal prosecution. 7 The rationale 
for these disqualifications was based on a fear of inaccurate, and especially 
§ 5.3. I G. LILLY,ANINTRODUCI'IONTOTHELAWOFEVIDENCE§ 64 (1978); c. McCORMICK, 
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 249, at 590 (2d ed. 1972); K.B. HUGHES, 
MASSACHUSETTS PRACI'ICE: EVIDENCE § 453(3), at 594 (1961). 
2 See McCoRMICK, supra note 1, at § 294; LILLY, supra note 1, at § 64; HUGHES, supra note 1, 
at§ 566. See also infra note 16 and accompanying text. Other examples wherein mental state is 
relevant include determination of domicile, and transfers of property with the intention of 
defrauding creditors. Mc<:;oRMICK, supra note 1, § 294 at 695. 
' See Commonwealth v. Aguiar, 370 Mass. 490, 350 N.E.2d 436 (1976); Commonwealth v. 
Woodward, 102 Mass. ISS (1869). Cf. Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 338 Mass. 130, 134, 154 
N.E.2d 130, 133 (1958) (certain conduct by defendant created negative inference of guilt). 
One typical example of evidence which circumstantially points toward guilt is flight by the 
accused from the scene of the crime. See Commonwealth v. Geagan, 339 Mass. 487, 512, 159 
N.E.2d 870, 887-88, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 895 (1959); Commonwealth v. Cataldo, 326 Mass. 
373, 376, 94 N.E.2d 761, 762 (1950); McCORMICK, supra note l, at§ 271; P. LIACOS, HANO.. 
BOOKOFMAsSACHUSETTSEVIDENCE281-82 (5th ed. 1981). But see Wong Sun v. United States, 
371 U.S. 471,483 n.lO (1963) ("[W]e have consistently doubted the probative value in criminal 
trials of evidence that the accused fled the scene of an actual or supposed crime."). Not-
withstanding Wong Sun, a negative inference was desired in Commonwealth v. Caldron, 1981 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 620, 626, 417 N.E.2d 958, 961 (1981). 
• See HUGHES, supra note 1, at §§ 453(3), 567. 
' McCoRMICK, supra note 1, at § 65 (extended to "the parties to the lawsuit and ... all per-
sons having a direct pecuniary or proprietary interest in the outcome''); HUGHES, supra note 1, 
at § 121. Competence addresses the testimonial qualifications of witnesses. Today, witnesses 
are incompetent to testify when they are incapable of perceiving, remembering, or describing 
the event at issue, or when they are incapable of appreciating the duty to testify truthfully. LIL-
LY, supra note l, at§ 22. 
• McCORMICK, supra note 1, at§ 65; HUGHES, supra note 1, at§ 121; LILLY, supra note 1, at 
§ 22. 
' HUGHES, supra note 1, at § 121. 
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perjured, testimony.' The judicial system instead relied upon the personal 
knowledge and out of court investigations of jurors to settle disputes. 9 To-
day, however, the judicial system operates in an adversarial fashion. 10 The 
blanket incompetency rule no longer exists; 11 it was abolished by statute in 
this Commonwealth more than a century ago. 12 
Despite a statutory abrogation of the blanket incompetency rule, two 
remnants of the common law rule persist .. These two remnants, that of 
proving intent only by the use of circumstantial evidence and that of ex-
cluding testimony because it is self-serving, perpetuate an antiquated view 
that all potentially biased testimony should be excluded. The first remnant, 
whereby intent must be proved exclusively by circumstantial evidence, ap-
parently emerged as a de facto consequence of the blanket incompetency 
rules. 13 With an interested party disqualified from testifying, his intent, 
when it was a material fact, could be proved only circumstantially. 14 Based 
upon this origin, however, restricting proof of intent to circumstantial 
evidence no longer is sustainable once the underlying incompetency rule is 
eliminated. 15 The rule today, is that, when intent is a factual issue to be 
proved, direct testimony relating to it is to be admitted in this Com-
monwealth. 16 
The second remnant of the common law blanket incompetency rule, 
whereby evidence may be excluded because it is self-serving, continues to 
• LILLY, supra note 1, at§ 22; see HUGHES, supra note 1, at§ 121. 
' HUGHES, supra note 1, at § 4S 1. 
10 ld. at § 4S2. 
" HuGHES, supra note 1, at§ 121; LILLY, supra, note 1, at§ 22. See F'Eo. R. Evm. 601 & ad,-
visory committee note; MAss. R. Evm. 601 (Proposed Draft 1980). 
12 HUGHES, supra note 1, at § 4SS; see 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ S79, at 826 n.2 (Chad-
bourne rev. 1979); LIAcos, supra note 3, at 173-76; see also J.B Thayer, A Chapter of Legal 
History in Massachusetts, 9 HARV. L. REv. 1, 11-12 (l89S) (parties to civil lawsuit made compe-
tent in 18S6; criminal defendant made competent in 1866). 
The law in Massachusetts presently reads: 
Any person of sufficient understanding, although a party, may testify in any pro-
ceeding, civil or criminal, in court or before a person who has authority to receive 
evidence, except as follows: 
• • • 
Thkd, The defendant in the trial of an indictment, complaint or other criminal pro-
ceeding shall, at his own request, but not otherwise, be allowed to testify; but his neglect 
or refusal to testify shall not create any presumption against him. 
G.L. c. 233, § 20. 
" 2 WIGMORE, supra note 12, at § S81. 
14 See id. 
IS Id. 
" Commonwealth Bank & Trust Co. v. Plotkin, 371 Mass. 218, 221, 3SS N.E.2d 917, 919 
(1976); Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 338 Mass. 130, 134, 1S4 N.E.2d 130, 133 (19S8); Com-
monwealth v. Woodward, 102 Mass. ISS, 161 (1869). Accord Crawford v. United States, 212 
u.s. 183, 20U3 (1909). 
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cause substantial confusion in Massachusetts. 17 The exclusion of self-
serving testimony, like the rule regulating the manner in which intent may 
be demonstrated, has been justified on the basis of potential unreliability. 18 
The fear of unreliability notwithstanding, confusion has resulted from rote 
application of a self-serving declaration label. Originally, the exclusion was 
designed to restrict out of court declarations by a party who himself was dis-
qualified from testifying at trial due to the blanket incompetency rule. 
Without a rule excluding such declarations, interested parties easily could 
circumvent the blanket incompetency rule by making a declaration, whether 
fabricated or not, in the presence of a disinterested witness who later could 
repeat the declaration at trial. 19 The self-serving declaration label also has 
been applied to the retrospective trial testimony of interested witnesses, 
even though, when considered in light of the abolition of blanket in-
competency such an application can lead to a contradictory result. 20 Proper-
ly, the potential self -serving aspect of a witness' retrospective trial 
testimony should be considered exclusively as a question of that witness' 
credibility. 21 Unfortunately, application of the self-serving testimony exclu-
sion, in lieu of the former blanket incompetency rule, remains possible due 
to imprecise language in several court opinions. 22 Similarly, insofar as the 
exclusion ostensibly pertained to self-serving out of court declarations, 
precedent has not expressed clearly the true nature of the exclusion. 23 The 
rule today in Massachusetts is that out of court declarations are to be ex-
" HuGHES, supra note 1, at § 453(3); see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fatalo, 345 Mass. 85, 
86-88, 185 N.E.2d 754, 755-56 (1962). 
11 HUGHES, supra note 1, at § 453(3); MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 290. See 6 J. WIGMORE, 
EVIDENCE§ 1732, at 158 n.6 (Chadbourn rev. 1976). 
" HuGHES, supra note 1, § 455, at 606 n.68. 
•• For example, in Commonweatlh v. Fatalo, 345 Mass. 85, 185 N.E.2d 754 (1962), the 
defendant sought to testify as to why he had failed to inform the police of a certain matter. 
This testimony was excluded on the ground that it was self-serving. The Supreme Judicial 
Court, however, denounced the use of a self-serving evidentiary label. See 345 Mass. at 86-88, 
185 N.E.2d at 755-56. The practical effect of the trial judge's ruling was to nullify the statute 
rendering the defendant competent to testify. 
2 ' Assessors of Pittsfield v. W.T. Grant Co., 329 Mass. 359, 361 108 N.E.2d 536, 537 
(1952); see LIAcos, supra note 3, at 176; McCoRMICK, supra note 1, at § 65. 
22 E.g., Bouchard v. Bouchard, 313 Mass. 531, 48 N.E.2d 161 (1943) (self-serving declara-
tions are not admissible in party's favor; discussing admissibility of letters); Commonwealth v. 
Cantor, 253 Mass. 509, 149 N.E. 205 (1925) (statement excluded because it was "merely self-
serving;" i.e., hearsay statement); HuGHES, supra note 1, at § 455 ("From its ready employ-
ment of the term, the impression is often created that [the Massachusetts) Court applies a 
separate and sweeping rule of exclusion of self-serving declarations, made and offered by a 
party to the action." Discussing extrajudicial statements). 
" See Commonwealth v. Fatalo, 345 Mass. 85, 185 N.E.2d 754 (1962); HUGHES, supra note 
1, at§ 455. 
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eluded solely as a matter of hearsay, and even then may be admitted if they 
meet the criteria of a recognized hearsay exception. 24 
Hearsay statements are defmed as any out of court declaration subse-
quently offered at trial as proof of the matter asserted therein. 25 The hear-
say rule renders inadmissible all hearsay evidence, unless the particular 
evidence falls within a recognized exception to the general hearsay exclu-
sion, 26 or unless no objection is received as to its admission. 27 The tradi-
tional explanation for excluding hearsay rests on the potential unreliability 
of such evidence; the factfinder is asked to accept the veracity of the 
declaration without the benefit of three features which encourage in-court 
credibility: oath or affirmation, personal presence at trial, and cross-
examination. 21 Exceptions to the hearsay rule have been allowed when (1) 
there is a particularly strong need to admit evidence which otherwise would 
be excluded, and (2) the hearsay declaration is made in a context which of-
fers some additional assurance of the statement's reliability. 29 Among the 
recognized hearsay exceptions is hearsay evidence descriptive of a present 
state of mind. 30 This state of mind exception, which permits the introduc-
tion of out of court declarations on criminal intent, 31 is justified on the 
theory that its contemporaneity with the mental condition it describes 
reduces the possibility of contrivance, coupled with the difficulty of other-
wise ascertaining the disputed state of mind. 32 
" See Commonwealth v. Fatalo, 345 Mass. 85, 185 N.E.2d 754 (1962); HUGHEs, supra note 
1, at § 455. 
" LIAcos, supra note 3, at 262; HUGHES, supra note 1, at§ 453 n.34; FED. R. Evm. 801(c); 
MASS. R. Evm. 801(c) (Proposed Draft 1980). 
10 See LIACOS, supra note 3, at 262; HUGHES, supra note 1, at § 453; FED. R. Evm. 802-804; 
MAss. R. Evm. 802-804 (Proposed Draft 1980). 
17 Freyermuth v. Lutfy, 376 Mass. 612,616-17, 382 N.E.2d 1059, 1063 (1978); LIAcos,supra 
note 3, at 266; HuGHES, supra note 1, at§ 452. 
11 McCoRMick, supra note 1, at§ 245. For a history of the hearsay ru1e, see id. at§ 244. See 
a/so, 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 1364 (Chadbourn rev. 1974). 
1
' LIAcos, supra note 3, at 266; McCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 290. 
•• Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1861, 409 N.E.2d 188 (1980); Com-
monwealth v. Wampler, 369 Mass. 121, 337 N.E.2d 892 (1975); Commonwealth v. DelValle, 
351 Mass. 489, 221 N.E.2d 922 (1966); Commonwealth v. Trefethen, 157 Mass. 180, 31 N.E. 
961 (1892) LIACOS, supra note 3, at 348. See Commonwealth v. Trainor, 374 Mass. 796, 374 
N.E.2d 1216 (1978). 
The present codification of this hearsay exception permits the introduction of "[a) statement 
of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotiQn, sensation, or physical condition (such 
as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a 
statement of memory of belief to prove the fact remembered or ~elieved .... " FED. R. Evm. 
803(3); MASS. R. Evm. 803(3) (Proposed Draft 1980). 
" See Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1861, 1865, 409 N.E.2d 188, 192 
(1980); McCORMICK, supra note 1, at§ 294(a). 
'
1 HUGHES, supra note 1, at § 567; McCoRMICK, supra note 1, at § 294(a). 
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During the Survey year, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was 
presented with an opportunity to clarify these evidentiary rules. In Com-
monwealth v. Caldron, 33 the Court considered the admissibility of both 
direct testimony retrospectively descriptive of past states of mind as well as 
testimony seeking to recount previous conversations which themselves ad-
dressed mental condition. The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that both 
types of testimony should have been admitted. 
The factual issue in Caldron was whether the defendant actually and in-
tentionally participated in a combination robbery and assault. The victim of 
the attack testified on direct examination that he was accosted by two men 
late one night in Boston. 34 These men were identified as the defendant, 
Jesus Caldron, and his companion, Joseph Pope. B The victim stated that as 
the two men approached him, Pope told him that he was going to be 
robbed. 36 The attack, the victim further testified, began with the defendant 
striking him and then holding his arms while Pope rummaged through his 
pockets. 37 The victim maintained that a fisherman's knife and a wallet were 
removed by Pope. 31 Eventually, the victim explained, he managed to free 
one of his arms, whereupon Pope stabbed him with the knife. 39 Pope and 
the defendant immediately fled after the stabbing, according to the victim, 
but they were apprehended by the police less than fifteen minutes later. 40 
The accuracy of the victim's description of the attack, however, was 
challenged by two points raised on cross-examination. First, the victim was 
forced to concede that, although on direct examination he seemed confident 
in his description, 41 during the initial grand jury inquiry he was unsure as to 
what each of the two assailants actually had done. 42 Second, despite his 
direct testimony that the defendant assaulted him, 43 the victim admitted tell-
ing the defendant's counsel, one day prior to the trial, that the defendant 
had not participated in the attack. 44 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 620, 417 N.E.2d 958 (1981). 
" /d. at 621, 417 N.E.2d at 959. 
" /d. 
,. /d. 
" /d. 
" /d. The victim added that his wrist watch also had been taken. /d. 
,. /d. 
•• /d. at 621-22,417 N.E.2d at 959. One of the two police officers who participated in the ar-
rest also testified. /d. at 622, 417 N.E.2d at 959. 
41 /d. 
42 /d. The lapse of time between the attack and trial should be noted. The attack occurred in 
July, 1976. A grand jury inquiry was held approximately one month later. The jury trial, for an 
unexplained reason, was delayed until December, 1979. See id. at 621-23,417 N.E.2d at 959. 
•• /d. at 621-22, 417 N.E.2d at 959. 
•• /d. at 622-23, 417 N.E.2d at 959. 
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The victim's testimony was further rebutted by the defendant, who was 
called as the only defense witness. 45 The defendant explained he had known 
Pope only for a short time prior to the robbery, and the two men were look-
ing for Pope's girlfriend on the night of the attack. 46 According to the 
defendant, Pope unexpectedly and unilaterally initiated the assault, and 
then shouted for the defendant to participate. 47 The defendant testified that 
he refused to join in, and instead attempted to stop the attack. 48 Uncertain 
as to whether he had touched the victim at all during the altercation, the 
defendant speculated that if he had, it was as he tried to pull back Pope. 49 
The defendant insisted that although he remembered seeing Pope clasp 
money and a shiny object, he never realized the victim was stabbed until be-
ing so informed following his arrest. 50 
The evidentiary dispute emerged from the defendant's assertion that he 
never intended to participate in the attack. The defendant's testimony in 
part was designed to bolster this position. Yet when defense counsel asked 
the defendant whether he ever intended to rob the victim, this question was 
excluded upon an objection raised by the Commonwealth. 5 1 Moreover, on 
three other occasions during the defendant's testimony the trial judge sus-
tained objections to questions seeking details of an argument between Pope 
and the defendant immediately after they had fled from the scene. 52 As a 
result of these exclusions, the defense was left with only bits of rambling 
answers by the defendant to support his claimed absence of criminal 
intent. 53 
The Supreme Judicial Court considered, inter alia, ' 4 the propriety of the 
trial court's rulings excluding proffered testimony on criminal intent." The 
court's analysis on this broad issue was undertaken in two parts. The first 
part of the analysis addressed the excluded testimony by the defendant 
directly describing his own intent;'6 the second part focused on the excluded 
" Id. at 622, 417 N.E.2d at 959. His companion, Pope, was not called to testify. 
•• Id . 
• , Id. 
•• Id. 
•• Id. 
•• Id. 
" Id. at 623, 417 N.E.2d at 959. No offer of proof was made by the defendant. Id. at 623 
n.2, 417 N.E.2d at 960 n.2. This issue is discussed infra at note 84. 
52 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 623, 417 N.E.2d at 959-60. 
" Id. at 626, 417 N.E.2d at 961. 
•• The Supreme Judicial Court also examined questions-relating to the admissibility, for im-
peachment purposes, of evidence disclosing prior convictions. The Court held that this ques-
tion was not open to appellate review, referring to its decision in Commonwealth v. Diaz, 1981 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 605, 417 N.E.2d 950 (1981). Diaz, decided the same day as Caldron, is dis-
cussed in§ 8.1 of this SURVEY. 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 621 417 N.E.2d at 958. 
" Id. at 623-24, 417 N.E.2d at 959-60. 
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testimony which would have recounted a conversation between the defend-
ant and Pope. 57 The Court held that it was error to deny the defendant an 
opportunity to testify as to his intent. 58 Wrongful intent or purpose, the 
Court explained, was an element in each of the crimes with which the 
defendant had been charged, 59 adding that testimony relating to intent con-
sequently was relevant. 60 The Court stated that relevant testimony should be 
admitted unless it can be excluded by a particular evidentiary rule. 61 The 
Court found that in Caldron no such exclusionary rule was applicable. n 
The Court considered whether the defendant's testimony describing his 
own intent could be excluded because the testimony was self-serving. 63 The 
Court was not persuaded by this argument, however, and instead deter-
mined that the virtually unanimous rule permits a party to testify as to his 
own intent. 64 The Court added that it was of no consequence, insofar as ad-
missibility is concerned, that the proffered testimony was self-serving. 65 The 
Court concluded its discussion on this issue by explaining that all testimony 
offered by a criminal defendant during his direct examination is likely to be 
self-serving, so this inevitability cannot be a legitimate basis for excluding 
it. 66 
After concluding that the defendant's testimony describing his own intent 
should have been admitted, the Supreme Judicial Court next considered the 
excluded testimony recounting an argument the defendant had with Pope in 
the moments between the attack and their arrest. The precise nature of the 
excluded testimony was not clear to the Court, as the defendant had failed 
to make an offer of proof. 67 Notwithstanding the defendant's neglect, the 
Court surmised that the testimony either would have dealt with a general 
argument providing inferential evidence of the defendant's state of mind, or 
would have been a direct statement made by the defendant descriptive of 
that mental condition. 68 
The Commonwealth contended only that the testimony, in either event, 
was excludable pursuant to the hearsay rule. 69 The Supreme Judicial Court, 
" Id. at 624-25, 417 N.E.2d at 960-61. 
" /d. at 623, 417 N.E.2d at 960. 
" Id. The defendant was charged under G.L. c. 265, §§ 15A, 19. 
•• 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 623-24, 417 N.E.2d at 960. 
61 /d. 
" /d. at 624, 417 N.E.2d at 960 . 
.. /d . 
•• /d . 
.. /d. 
" /d. See also United Statesv. Matot, 146 F.2d 197, 198-99 (2d Cir. 1944); Commonwealth 
v. Fatalo, 345 Mass. 85, 185 N.E.2d 754 (1962). 
67 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 624 n.3, 417 N.E.2d at 960 n.3. This aspect of Caldron is con-
sidered infra at note 84. 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 624, 417 N.E.2d at 960 . 
.. /d. 
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however, disagreed. The Court explained that if the testimony provided on-
ly inferential evidence of the defendant's mental state, then the testimony 
would fall without the hearsay rule. 70 Conversely, if the testimony offered 
prior statements by the defendant directly describing his mental condition, 
then according to the Court the hearsay rule would apply. 71 Even here, the 
Court added, a direct assertion in an out of court statement may be ad-
mitted under a state of mind exception to the hearsay rule. 72 Acknowledging 
that this hearsay exception was limited to declarations contemporaneous to 
the mental state described, 73 the Court held that the declaration in Caldron, 
made only moments after the attack, was admissible due to its proximity in 
time and sufficient probative value. 74 Furthermore, the Court concluded, 
the declaration should have been admitted, for these same reasons, even if it 
described what was technically the defendant's previous state of mind. 75 
The conclusion reached by the Supreme Judicial Court, whereby the 
defendant's testimony directly describing his own intent during the attack 
should have been admitted/6 is supported by both precedent and policy. 
The rule in this Commonwealth, and repeated in Caldron, 77 is that relevant 
evidence is to be admitted unless some particular rule requires its 
exclusion. 71 In Caldron, the defendant's testimony was relevant for it ad-
dressed his intent, which was a material element in each of the crimes al-
leged. 79 The exclusion could not be justified using the former de facto 
'
0 Id. at 624-25, 417 N.E.2d at 960-61. 
" Id. at 625, 417 N.E.2d at 961. 
"Id. 
" Id. at 625 & n.4, 417 N.E.2d at 961 & n.4. 
,. Id. 
" Id. at 626 n.4, 417 N.E.2d at 961 n.4. The Court ultimately determined that the erroneous 
exclusions were not harmless. Id. at 626-28 & n.5, 417 N.E.2d at 961-62 & n.5. In reaching this 
conclusion, the Court focused primarily on the excluded testimony wherein the defendant 
sought to describe his intent retrospectively. The excluded testimony, according to the Court, 
could not be viewed as cumulative simply due to the admission of other rambling evidence on 
point. Id. at 626, 417 N.E.2d at 961. The Court added that no factor which otherwise might 
mitigate the erroneous exclusion, such as evidence overwhelmingly supporting guilt or disprov-
ing it, was present. In fact, the Court noted, the harm resulting from the trial judge's ruling ex-
cluding the retrospective testimony on intent was exascerbated by the other erroneous rulings 
excluding the conversation between Pope and the defendant. Id. at 626-28, 417 N.E.2d at 
961-62. 
" Id.at 623, 417 N.E.2d at 960. 
" Id. at 623-24, 417 N.E.2d at 960. 
71 Kramer v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 336 Mass. 465, 467, 146 N.E.2d 357, 
358-59 (1957); HUGHES, supra note 1, at§ 283; see FED. R. EVID. 402, 403; MAss. R. EVID. 402, 
403 (Proposed Draft 1980). 
" Regarding the charge for assault and battery under G.L. c. 265, § 15A, see Salemme v. 
Commonwealth, 370 Mass. 421, 424, 348 N.E.2d 799, 801 (1976); accord Commonwealth v. 
Meadows, 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1875, 1880, 428 N.E.2d 321, 324 (1981). Regarding 
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restriction on party testimony regarding intent; formalization of this restric-
tion, once it ceased to be a de facto phenomenon, has been universally re-
jected. 80 Similarly, the trial judge's ruling highlights a continued 
misunderstanding of the scope of the now discredited rationale excluding as 
self-serving out of court party declarations. 81 Application of a rule pro-
hibiting parties from introducing self-serving retrospective testimony effec-
tively would nullify statutes rendering interested witnesses competent to 
testify, and also would impair the adversarial system presently used. Such a 
scenario is contrary to the scheme which actually exists. The rule in 
Massachusetts, as reaffirmed in Caldron, is that a witness, whether or not 
he is a party, is not incompetent to testify at trial due to his interest in the 
outcome;12 as a competent witness, he is disqualified neither wholly nor par-
tially from testifying on any relevant matter including his intent, simply 
because his testimony may be self-serving. 83 
The Supreme Judicial Court's conclusion holding admissible the excluded 
testimony recounting a previous conversation between Pope and the 
defendant, also represents a sound determination. Unfortunately, analysis 
of this issue is made more complex, as it was for the Court, due to the 
defendant's failure to make an offer of proof. 84 The Court nevertheless 
speculated that this testimony either would have provided inferential 
evidence of the defendant's mental condition, or would have been a direct 
assertion by the defendant to Pope descriptive of that mental state. as As 
the robbery charge, G.L. c. 265, § 19, see Commonwealth v. Richards, 363 Mass. 299, 307-08, 
293 N.E.2d 854, 860 (1973); Commonwealth v. Weiner, 255 Mass. 506,509, 152 N.E. 359, 360 
(1926). 
10 See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text. 
" See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text. 
" See supra notes 11, 12. See also Caldron, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 623-24, 417 N.E.2d at 
960. 
" See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text. 
•• See 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 623 n.2, 624 n.3, 417 N.E.2d at 960 nn. 2, 3 (1981). Justice 
Liacos explains that an offer of proof helps to demonstrate that the proponent was prejudiced 
by the evidentiary exclusion. Without such an offer, the appellate court normally has no basis 
for reversing, for it cannot know whether the excluded answer would have been favorable or 
not, and therefore is unable to determine whether the exclusion has caused harm. LIAcos, 
supra note 3, at 78. A second purpose of an offer of proof is to permit the trial judge to recon-
sider the evidentiary question, this time aided by knowing what the challenged answer will be. 
HuGHES, supra note 1, at § 214. 
Notwithstanding the role played by offers of proof, failure to make such an offer is excused 
when the excluded answer is apparent from the context of the testimony or when the trial judge 
excludes all testimony on the particular issue. See First Nat'! Bank of Mount Dora v. Shawmut 
Bank of Boston, N.A., 378 Mass. 137, 141, 389 N.E.2d 1002, 1005 (1979); Ratner v. Canadian 
Universal Ins. Co., 359 Mass. 375, 385, 269 N.E.2d 227, 232 (1971); Moran v. Levin, 318 
Mass. 770, 773-74, 64 N.E.2d 360, 362 (1945); FED. R. Evm.103(a)(2); MASS. R. Evm.l03(a)(2) 
(Proposed Draft 1980). 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 624, 417 N.E.2d at 960. 
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previously noted, the notion of self-serving testimony, although it osten-
sibly applied to out of court declarations, no longer has significance in 
terms of admissibility. 86 Consequently, if this testimony recounting prior 
testimony was not to be admitted, the exclusion would be founded on the 
hearsay rule. 87 
The defendant's testimony, if it would have provided merely inferential 
evidence of his state of mind, would not have been hearsay and therefore 
could not be excluded because of that rule. For example, the defendant, 
shocked and frightened by what had transpired, might have said to Pope 
something similar to ''You are crazy to have jumped that guy the way you 
did." Such a statement should be admitted. It is relevant as evidence from 
which a factfinder could draw an inference that the defendant indeed was 
surprised there had been an attack. 88 It would seem far less likely the 
defendant had the requisite criminal intent based upon the above mentioned 
declaration. Moreover, this declaration, though made out of court, could 
not be excluded under the hearsay rule, for it is not offered to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted therein. 89 Regardless of whether or not Pope is 
crazy, as the defendant had asserted, the factfinder can elicit significant and 
relevant information from the declaration. When an out of court declara-
tion is offered for a nonhearsay purpose, it cannot be excluded by the hear-
say rule. 90 
If the recounted conversation was not limited to inferential evidence, and 
instead included direct assertions by the defendant descriptive of his mental 
state, then the hearsay rule would apply. 91 In such a case, the defendant 
would be asking a factfinder at trial to accept as indicative of the truth these 
earlier declarations made by the defendant to Pope. Under the accepted ter-
minology, he would be offering out of court declarations in court as proof 
of the matter asserted in those statements.92 Notwithstanding the technical 
purity of this distinction, however, in practice and theory it somewhat is 
blurred in Massachusetts.93 As the Court noted in Caldron, evidence of 
mental condition appears to be equally reliable whether received directly or 
circumstantially. 94 This type of evidence, therefore, often is admitted, either 
as nonhearsay or as part of the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule. 9' 
16 See supra notes 17·24 and accompanying text. 
11 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
11 See HUGHES, supra note 1, § 453(3) at S9S. 
" See LILLY, supra note 1, at§ SO. 
,. See Id.; HuGHES, supra note 1, at § 563; LIACOS, supra note 3, at 262-63. 
" See LILLY, supra note 1, at§ SO; McCoRMICK, supra note 1, § 249, at 590. 
" ~supra note 2S and accompanyin& text. 
" See infra note 95. 
•• 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 624-25, 417 N.E.2d at 960-61. 
" See Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1861, 1865, 409 N.E.2d 188, 192 
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Despite the Court's desire to admit testimony of this variety, it must be 
emphasized that the state of mind hearsay exception has several pre-
requisites; only certain types of declarations will be admissible under this 
exception. The exception permits the introduction of a hearsay declaration 
of the declarant's then existing mental, emotional, sensational or physical 
condition, except for statements of memory offered to prove the fact 
remembered. 96 Before the Caldron declaration could be admitted under this 
hearsay exception, however, two potential problems must be addressed. 
First, the state of mind exception requires that the out of court declaration 
describe a present mental condition. 97 Although the defendant's testimony 
must be determined by speculation, it is possible that the declaration would 
have been something like "Pope, I am shocked that you could suddenly at-
tack and rob that defenseless man." In this example the defendant, by re-
counting this testimony, is seeking to convince the factfinder that he actual-
ly was shocked by his companion's sudden conduct; he is offering the out of 
court declaration as proof of the matter asserted in iU8 Yet the hearsay 
statement is not strictly contemporaneous with the defendant's state of 
mind at the time of the attack. Rather, it indicates his mental condition 
shortly after the attack had concluded. The Supreme Judicial Court found 
the declaration to be close enough chronologically, and of sufficient pro-
bative value, to merit its admission within the exception. 99 This ruling com-
ports with other decisions by the Court rejecting the notion of strict contem-
poraneity in favor of a transactional approach, when evaluating certain of 
the hearsay exceptions! 00 Under this analysis, the defendant's declaration 
(1980); Commonwealth v. Wampler, 369 Mass. 121, 123, 337 N.E.2d 892, 893-94 (1975); Mc-
CORMICK, supra note 1, at§ 294(a); LILLY, supra note 1, at§ 50. 
" FED. R. Evm. 803(3); MAss. R. Evm. 803(3) (Proposed Draft 1980). See also supra note 
30. 
" See supra note 96. See also LIACOS, supra note 3, at 348; McCORMICK, supra note 1, at 
§ 294(a). 
" See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
" See 1981 Mass. AJiv. Sh. at 625 & n.4, 417 N.E.2d at 961 & n.4. 
100 The state of mind hearsay exception, FED. R. Evm. 803(3), MASs. R. Evm. 803(3) (Pro-
posed Draft 1980), is a specialized application of the present sense impression hearsay excep-
tion, FED. R. Evn'>. 803(1), MAss. R. Evm. 803(1) (Proposed Draft 1980), separated to enhance 
its usefulness and accessibility. FED. R. Evm. 803 advisory committee note. This latter hearsay 
exception in turn is related to a third hearsay exception, for excited utterances, FED. R. Evm. 
803(2), MASS. R. Evm. 303(2) (Proposed Draft 1980). LIAcos,supra note 3, at 351-52; FED. R. 
Evm. 803 advisory committee note. The hypothetical declaration herein under consideration 
especially resembles the excited utterance exception for it would have been a spontaneous ex-
clamation made under the impulse of shock which characterizes and explains the event to 
which it relates. See LIACOS, supra note 3, at 350. 
Massachusetts traditionally has required strict contemporaneity when using the excited ut-
terance exception, but this requirement recently has been relaxed. /d. at 350-51. Rather than 
imposing strict time limits, courts prefer to consider the facts in the particular case, and will ad-
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in Caldron, made during their flight from the scene of the attack, presents a 
combination of necessity and spontaneity-induced reliability to be included 
within the state of mind exception. 
The second problem requiring attention before the defendant's testimony 
acceptably could be admitted relates to a declaration saying ''Pope, how 
could you attack that man; I did not intend to attack him." This type of 
statement is one descriptive of a past state of mind. As such it too would not 
conform to the requirements of the hearsay exception currently under 
scrutiny. The Supreme Judicial Court again considered the overall transac-
tion, and found that the statement would have qualified as a present 
declaration. 101 The Court noted, moreover, that Wigmore would admit 
even statements of past mental conditions. 102 Permitting this testimony to 
be admitted seems to be sound, at least when admission is the conclusion 
reached by employing the transactional analysis. Under this analysis, until 
the overall event concludes, there is little to distinguish a present declaration 
in one part of the transaction from what technically is a past declaration in a 
later part of it. In addition, as the event was fresh in the defendant's mind at 
the time he made the declaration, the statement should be at least as helpful 
to a factfinder as would be the defendant's retrospective description at trial. 
Finally, in evaluating the liberal approach undertaken by the Supreme 
Judicial Court in Caldron, respecting both possible versions of the re-
counted conversation, the practitioner should consider that the declarant 
and subsequent trial witness were one in the same. Consequently, an oppor-
tunity for cross-examination existed; the factfinder was not relegated ex-
clusively to rely on the hearsay declaration for its veracity. When the hear-
say declarant subsequently testifies at trial, it has been urged that courts 
should be more liberal in admitting the out of court declaration. 103 The 
mit subsequent declarations where the delay was not long enough to allow the exciting in-
fluence to dissipate. Commonwealth v. Sellon, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 789, 797-98, 402 N.E.2d 
1329, 1337 (1980); Rocco v. Boston-Leader, Inc., 340 Mass. 195, 196-97, 163 N.E.2d 157, 158 
(1960). Accord Commonwealth v. Trefethen, 157 Mass. 180, 31 N.E. 961 (1892) (declarations 
respecting mental condition should be admitted if sufficiently near in point of time); McCOR· 
MICK, supra note 1, at § 294(a) (considering state of mind exception); 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 
§ 1732, at 161-62 (Chadbourn rev. 1976). 
101 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 625 n.4; 417 N.E.2d at 961 n.4. 
102 /d. (citing 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 1732, at 161 (Chadbourn rev. 1976)). McCormick 
warns that if retrospective testimony is not carefully controlled, it could amount to allowing 
"the exception for declarations of mental state to swallow substantially the entire hearsay 
rule." McCORMICK, supra note 1, § 296(c), at 701. 
103 McCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 251 (Prior statements are more recent than latter 
testimony, so probably more accurate; also an opportunity for cross-examination); LILLY, 
supra note 1, at § 52; cf. 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 1732, at 156 (Chadbourn rev. 1976) 
(whereas an accused's statements often can be used against him as admissions, there is a strong 
judicial tendency to admit statements offered in his favor). In certain circumstances, a witness 
could avoid the hearsay problem entirely by adopting his prior declaration at trial. See FED. R. 
EviD. 801(d) advisory committee note. 
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Supreme Judicial Court did not discuss this element of the hearsay issue in 
Caldron, thereby leaving open the question of whether the transactional ap-
proach might be constricted somewhat when the hearsay declaration is to be 
recounted at trial by someone other than the original declarant. 
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